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Organizational Energy: A Behavioral Analysis
of Human and Organizational Factors
in Manufacturing
Zahir Irani, Amir M. Sharif, and Thanos Papadopoulos
Abstract—This paper seeks to explore the behavior and embod-
ied energy involved in the decision-making of information technol-
ogy/information systems (IT/IS) investments using a case within a
small- to medium-sized manufacturing firm. By analyzing decision
making within a given case context, this paper describes the na-
ture of the investment through the lens of behavioral economics,
causality, input–output (IO) equilibrium, and the general notion
of depletion of executive energy function. To explore the interplay
between these elements, the authors structure the case context via
a morphological field in order to construct a fuzzy cognitive map
of decision-making relationships relating to the multidimensional
and nonquantifiable problems of IT/IS investment evaluation. Not-
ing the significance of inputs and outputs relating to the investment
decision within the case, the authors assess these cognitive interre-
lationships through the lens of the Leontief IO energy equilibrium
model. Subsequently, the authors suggest, through an embodied
energy audit, that all such management decisions are suscepti-
ble to decision fatigue (so-called “ego depletion”). The findings of
this paper highlight pertinent cognitive and IO paths of the in-
vestment decision-making process that will allow others making
similar types of investments to learn from and draw parallels from
such processes.
Index Terms—Behavior, decision making, embodied energy,
energy equilibrium model, fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM), in-
formation systems (IS), manufacturing, organizations, people,
relationships.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE IMPORTANCE of human and organizational factorsfor information systems (IS) adoption in manufacturing
has been highlighted in the extant literature [13], [14], [16],
[43]. Human factors include the views and needs of the relevant
stakeholders and decision makers, and human resources such
as management/staff time and training. Organizational factors
may include the organizational/managerial structure, leadership,
business processes, and organizational culture [22], [45].
The extensive use of IS in manufacturing is evident in its
evolution, from a limited data processing perspective, to an
expanded organization-wide scope of manufacturing computer-
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based activities [48]. Such IS regards information as a corporate
resource, with much potential to improve strategic, tactical, and
operational processes. Information systems evaluation (ISE) in-
volves, inter alia, information technology/information systems
(IT/IS) investments justification (decision making) at the orga-
nization’s strategic, tactical, and operational levels [3], [4].
The justification for IT/IS investments in both the manufac-
turing [25] and service sectors [16] includes an estimation of the
potential value of the IT/IS against well-organizational benefits,
costs, and risks. These benefits, costs, and risks are measured
through established criteria that enable organizational IT/IS de-
cision making and learning [18], [28], [34], [42]. Methods that
do not balance between benefits, costs, and risks impact neg-
atively IT/IS investment decisions, which may lead to IT/IS
failure [8], [24], [26], [53]. This has led scholars to conclude
that there is almost the same number of failed and successful IS
implementations [38].
To succeed in IT/IS investment decisions, organizations need
to better understand their human, organizational and techni-
cal dimensions. No matter if various evaluation methods and
perspectives exist [21], [22], organizations are still using the
traditional appraisal techniques that are based on financial mea-
sures and projections of the investment in question and do not
consider human or organizational factors [4], [14], [17], [20].
Hence, such methods pay limited, if any, attention, to the in-
tangible nature of many of IT/IS benefits and indirect costs
associated with the IS/IT investment [24], [30], [49].
To address this gap, this paper contributes to the ISE liter-
ature by providing an in-depth understanding of the behavior
and embodied energy of IT/IS investment decision making in
a manufacturing context focusing on human and organizational
factors. The reason for taking such a stance is rooted in the ar-
gument put forward by Courtney et al. [10], who suggest that
organizations that are unable to identify an underlying causal
model that influences and drives their decision making will be
liable to utilize decision-making tools and approaches that may
be inherently biased toward predetermined (even unsuccess-
ful) outcomes. Furthermore, Baumeister [2] and Anderson [1]
highlighted the importance of understanding the individual and
organizational energy involved in making successive executive
decisions, which in themselves may impact on the decision-
making process. A case study [54] on an IT/IS investment de-
cision that included, inter alia, Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) systems [5], [9], [33], [35] in a manufacturing Small and
Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) was followed, because of the
importance of ERP systems and the challenges related to IT/IS
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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decision making in manufacturing SMEs [49], such as limited
IS resources and competencies, diversity of suppliers, size, lim-
ited organizational specialization, intuitive strategic planning,
risk aversion, and environmental uncertainty; and the lack of re-
search on the behavior and embodied energy involved in IT/IS
investment decision making. The focus so far has been on holis-
tic models that integrate financial and nonfinancial factors using
multicriteria decision making, stochastic programming, and real
option approaches [25].
The contribution of this paper to the ISE literature lies in using
the lens of behavioral economics, causality, input–output (IO)
equilibrium, and the general notion of depletion of executive
energy function [29], [31], [37] to discuss dynamic individual
and organizational behaviors—that is, “individual and organi-
zational behavioral energy”—embodied in investment decisions
and ego-depletion, that is, a behavioral effect, which occurs as
a result of both loss of self-control (the conscious effort to al-
ter intrinsic behavior), and self-regulation (behavior, which is
driven by extrinsic norms and goals). This paper argues, fol-
lowing Baumeister [2], that an individual’s internal energy and
executive ISE decision-making resources can become depleted
following successive “withdrawals” from the need to make ISE
decisions.
II. ISS EVALUATION
The IS investment decisions are frequently based upon a pri-
ori determined, financially oriented criteria that aim to quantify
intangible benefits, costs, and risks, and are underpinned by
poor managerial control and responsibility, and limited under-
standing of the external and internal context. ISE requires an
understanding of the implications of technology for an organi-
zation’s strategic, tactical, and operational goals. There is a need
to understand both the basic principles and cultural aspects of
the business and its context (including human behavior), as well
as the prospective benefits, costs, and limitations of the IS/IT
investment in question. Current evaluation methods and tools
focus on measurable criteria and pay limited attention to those
human and organizational factors that significantly affect IT/IS
investment appraisal [21], [22]. This paper addresses this gap
and contributes to the extant literature by providing a deeper
understanding of the behavior and embodied energy involved in
the decision-making in a manufacturing organization, focusing
on human and organizational factors. The next section discusses
the research approach followed in this paper.
III. RESEARCH APPROACH
An exploratory case study research strategy [19], [54] was
adopted on a U.K.-based manufacturing SME, known, hence-
forth, as Alpha, Inc. The nature of the research question, man-
ifested as a need to capture rich data in the form of human
and organizational characteristics, and then, evaluate the invest-
ment decisions warranted a mixed-methods approach [52]. The
research design [11] is depicted in Fig. 1.
A. Data Collection
The data collection phase followed the normative literature
for conducting fieldwork in business management and the social
sciences [19], [44], [46], [54]. Following ethical approval, inter-
views and observations were conducted, supported by internal
and budget reports, filed accounts and archived documentation.
The authors drew upon their own extensive industrial experi-
ence to inform and guide the design of an interview protocol
that defined the scope of the necessary data to explore ISE [30].
Semistructured interviews were conducted with the Manag-
ing Director (MD), Production Director (PD), and Production
Manager (PM). They were followed by interviews with em-
ployees at the shop floor of Company A. Their duration was 1 h
on average. The interview questions focused on the necessity
for ISE decisions to be informed by human and organizational
factors. The interview guide was tested and piloted before data
collection, and the questions were formulated to permit com-
parisons across interviews [27] and avoid interviewer bias [44].
The interviews were conducted at the offices of the interviewees
and were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. The details of
the interviewees were coded to allow strict confidentiality and
anonymity, although all interviewees were aware that they could
be identified through the content of the text. After every inter-
view, each interviewee checked their transcript and resolved any
issues as per typical research approaches in this vein [27].
B. Data Coding
Data were coded using Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA)
[32], [46] to build an inductive frame of reference explaining
human and organizational factors in ISE decision making. The
researchers paid attention to how many times interviewees re-
ferred to each factor and how they reacted when asked to explain
forecasting factors involved in their area of responsibility. The
importance of each factor was graded as “High,” “Medium,”
“Low,” or “Do Not Know.” Hence, a clustering of the frequency
of these responses was carried out to confirm the aforementioned
list of given decision factors. Concepts from behavioral eco-
nomics (BE) were used to further understand the QCA factors
[15], [47], [51]. BE studies anomalous investor market behavior
and events based upon decision-making effects. It aims at under-
standing the human decision-making processes and especially
value and risk decisions [15], [25], [47], largely (idiosyncratic)
investor decisions, emotions, cognitive, and economic errors [2],
[25]. The morphological analysis (MA) technique [55] was used
to remove redundancies in the data collected and to identify so-
called “genuine uncertainties.” This involved categorizing the
QCA data into a series of themed subgroups, hence, morpho-
logical dimensions. Then, following field anomaly relaxation
(FAR) [40], a pairwise comparison between each of these factor
lists was carried out to remove duplicate items. This approach
is a well-grounded scenario planning technique used in strat-
egy formulation and futures forecasting [12], [15], [39] and was
used to code and structure the data for the analysis.
C. Data Analysis
Data Analysis involved mixed methods (see Fig. 1). These
are briefly discussed as follows.
1) Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (FCM): The basis of the FCM
approach [25], [43] involves creating a directed graph from a ma-
trix of fuzzy weights, derived from a matrix of interconnections
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Fig. 1. Research Design.
to produce a “map.” For a given pairwise combination of factors,
each combination is assigned a fuzzy weighting using a range
of positive to negative values. Given the weightings provided
are essentially “causal connections,” hence, a causal (cognitive)
mapping, this approach allows for the exploration of changes
to causal states over time for a given initial scenario (vector).
Each scenario defines a causal state or “situation,” which can be
fed into the FCM in order to explore and observe how causal
connections behave—providing an in-depth understanding of
the cognitive dimension of decision-making behaviors. In real
terms, each scenario is effectively an n by n vector of rank equiv-
alency to the fuzzy weight matrix, W (generated as a result of
the pairwise comparison across all factors identified).
Each starting vector is an enumeration of expert
knowledge/decision-making encoded into numerical fuzzy val-
ues per factor. The resulting weight matrix and vector are then
algorithmically computed according to the expression given in
(1), where computed values for each node (hence, system factor)
can then be plotted against each iterative step. As the results con-
verge and the RMS error norm of each fuzzy factor tends toward
a stabilized value, the computation ceases and a directed graph
can, therefore, be calculated as a result of matrix manipulation.
The following equation explains the aforementioned:
Ct+1i = f
⎛
⎝
n∑
j=1
WijC
t
i
⎞
⎠ + Ct−1i (1)
where Ct+1i is the value of the node at the t + 1 iteration, Ct−1i is
the value of the node at the t – 1 iteration, f is a given threshold or
transformation function, Wij is a corresponding fuzzy weight
between two given nodes, i and j, and Cti the value of the
interconnected fuzzy node at step t. The threshold function, f(x)
used in this research is the hyperbolic, tanh(x). The dynamic
simulation of an FCM behavior requires the additional definition
of the fuzzy weights, Wij , within a connection matrix, W, and
the initial or starting input vector at time t, Ct . As such, the latter
is a 1× n row vector with the values of all concepts, C1 , C2 , . . . ,
Cn for n concepts or nodes in the FCM, while the former is a
n × n matrix of weights between any two fuzzy nodes, wij . If
there is no direct relationship between the ith and jth nodes, then
the value of the connection strength is zero.
As such, the authors aim to use the FCM method to explore
the identified human and organizational decision-making factors
found as a result of the MA-FAR approach for Alpha. The aim
is to explore the decision behaviors, relationships, and thus, the
implicit “energy” dynamic between each of the factors.
2) IO Embodied Energy Model: To model/map the human
and organizational factors in terms of the “energy” involved in
these decisions, the authors apply the IO econometric approach
of Wassily Leontief [29]. This approach is regularly used in the
field of econometrics, and more specifically, energy economics
to account for energy flows and aggregations of inputs to outputs
in a system. The IO approach is matrix-based method, used to
relate and measure interdependences between different aspects
of an economy. The essence of this concept lies in identifying
and relating a set of outputs (from one industry sector) as a
set of inputs (to another industry sector) that ultimately provide
a method for measuring (economy-wide) impacts of a given
(sectorial economic) activity. The parentheses in the preceding
sentence pinpoint the rationale for adopting this method for the
remaining analysis within this research, namely, that a decision
that is required (output) affects and influences (the demand)
the variables that feed into it. The authors wish to point out
that this technique is much akin to other linear programming
methods such as the analytic hierarchy process but does not
involve any further quantification or prioritization of decision-
making factors. Furthermore, the intention is not to use the IO
model to forecast or assess the impact of decisions that have
been made but to add to the descriptive and narrative nature
of understanding the decision requirements/demands involved
in the given case in a multiobjective, qualitative manner. The
model is defined as follows:
x = (I −A)−1d (2)
where A is a matrix of given economic outputs, x is a vector of
total output, d is a vector of final economic demand, and I is the
diagonal identity matrix.
The IO approach outputs in terms of decision demands are
then considered through the concept of decision fatigue/ego
depletion [1], [2] to assess the behavioral impact of such de-
cisions and evaluated through an “embodied energy” audit of
all aspects of the decision-making analysis. Embodied energy
is normatively defined as the summary of energy that is needed
in order to produce a given set of goods or services embodied
directly in the asset itself. As such, this concept has been used
as a basis for determining the “energies” of an asset or process
across its lifecycle, from genesis to obsolescence. This involves
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determining all (input) materials, production factors, and as-
sociated resources. Hence, following Treloar [50], the authors
present an explanation of the embodied energy of the decisions
in the case context, as an energy path, which is the sum of the
FCM of causal behavioral interrelationships; the IO model of
decision demands; and the depletion of senior management’s
self-control and decision-making capacity.
IV. CASE STUDY: IS INVESTMENT IN ALPHA, INC.
Alpha, Inc., is a manufacturing SME. Its organizational struc-
ture comprises three directors, six managers, and approaching
150 operational employees (i.e., shop-floor workers). All direc-
tors are apprentice-trained engineers, and none had university or
significant management-level development. The company fol-
lows a hierarchical structure: employees report to managers,
who report to directors, and they report to the MD. Alpha, Inc.,
used to follow financial methods and tools for investment ap-
praisal. For instance, Alpha had applied cash flow projections
and sensitivity analysis to make decisions regarding computer
numerically controlled (CNC) equipment. However, after in-
vesting in production planning and control (PPC) and shop floor
data collection (SFDC) systems, they realized that the methods
and tools used were not fit for purpose. These systems were
underpinned by intangible and nonfinancial benefits, risks, and
costs that could not be assessed using their traditional appraisal
methods. The new and inexperienced management team of
Alpha, Inc., being unfamiliar with methods and tools that pay
attention to human and organizational factors in IT/IS invest-
ment appraisal, decided to use a simplistic cost-benefit analysis
(CBA).
Alpha initially appeared unconcerned with the limitations as-
sociated with the traditional investment appraisal approaches
but later concern grew, as their interest in the investment op-
portunity increased. This concern was well founded, as they
had previous experience and were accustomed to the traditional
appraisal approaches, good and bad.
The decision to buy the PPC/SFDC system was not success-
ful. In a later stage, it was realized that the systems did not fit
with their business strategy and jobbing processes. To address
these issues, it was decided to build internally an ERP system
that would fit with their strategy, needs, and processes. Further-
more, the senior management team believed that the ERP, being
internally developed, would be better supported by staff, and
also be a unique resource that would help Alpha achieve a com-
petitive advantage. To justify the investment in the new system,
Alpha invested time to brief the employees on the necessity of
the investment for the company. The senior management team
believed that the previous methods used had not paid sufficient
attention to human and organizational issues, which were indeed
highlighted by employees during their briefings on the benefits
of the new system. These aspects were not incorporated in their
traditional appraisal methods, including their CBA. Apart from
identifying and confirming the benefits previously thought by
the senior managers as important, the employees indicated the
expected costs of the system could be greater than originally
predicted by the CBA. The new cost category was incorporated
in a revised CBA. Therefore, Alpha could not be based solely on
CBA to account for the financial implications of the project, and
was based on the employees’ previous experience. The decision
to proceed with developing the system was, hence, an “act of
faith,” since the new dimensions could not be easily measured
by “hard”/financial indicators. Having faith in the success of
the project was based on the following aspects, which could
not be quantified, and hence, included in the previously adopted
traditional financial appraisal methods and tools.
1) Feedback and learning on previous implementations had
been considered.
2) The system would alleviate previous issues with informa-
tion asymmetry and silos between units and enable seam-
less flow of information across Alpha, creating thereby a
culture of collaboration—it would enable BPR.
3) Human and organizational issues have been reflected upon
after the failure of the PPC/SFDC.
V. ANALYSIS OF IS INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN ALPHA
A. Structuring the Context of Alpha, Inc.
The authors adopted a BE lens to examine IS evaluation
decisions in Alpha. Table I compares the primary attributes of
BE with the factors derived from applying QCA in Alpha.
Following MA [55], a morphological field of behavioral
decision-making factors was composed, based upon coded data
response groupings across factors of “Employee Commitment,”
“Cultural Change,” “Training and Education,” and “Manage-
ment Commitment.” This field comprises a cumulative com-
plexity of 70 possible scenario combinations (see Table II). By
applying FAR [40], this field was reduced down to 15 factors (a
21% reduction in the field complexity through the removal of
redundant or self-similar factors).
The MA-FAR analysis identified the following human and
organizational factors.
1) Anchoring Effect (AE): This is generally defined as pro-
viding reasons to relate unconnected events together, based upon
a biased view of the world. In the case of Alpha, it is translated
as management’s previous experience in making successful in-
vestment decisions.
Alpha followed a mature approach to decision making us-
ing a traditional CBA model to justify investments in machine
tools. This was the norm and an approach in which there was
institutional confidence. CBA underpinned the first large-scale
IT/IS investment, that is, the purchase of a vendor-packaged ap-
proach. The management team, led by the MD and his passionate
but autocratic leadership style maintained the status quo in the
investment decision process. Others felt too overwhelmed to
propose alternatives. The MD felt positive outcomes could only
ever be achieved if the idea and execution originated from him;
or, at least, that was a widespread view across the company.
This was further reinforced by perceived “successful” invest-
ment in past projects using a CBA approach. Therefore, leaving
the MD to question the need to consider alternatives, while the
same people making the investment decision were those who
carried out the postimplementation review (PIR), not unnatu-
rally always concluded that there was “never a bad investment
decision.”
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TABLE I
BE ATTRIBUTES DURING IT/IS INVESTMENT APPRAISAL IN ALPHA (BASED UPON [47] AND [51])
Behavioral Finance Facet Description Impact in Alpha,
Inc.
Evidence found within Alpha, Inc.
Agency Friction Inter-relationship between investor and
facilitating investment agent or body
High Conflictual relationship within the
management team and amongst team and
employees
Anchoring Effect Providing reasons to relate unconnected
events, based upon a biased view of the
world
Medium Management’s previous experience with
successful investment decisions
Asset Segregation Separation of assets into individual costs,
risks and benefits
Low Sole adoption of CBA and traditional
financial appraisal methods
Availability Error Psychological comparison with known
phenomena
Medium Management’s previous experience with
successful investment decisions
Biased Expectations An overconfidence in predicting uncertain
outcomes
Low The faith of the MD on the benefits of the
investment
Confirmation Bias Bias towards results/behaviors which
confirm predetermined outcomes and
ignoring all others
Low Sole adoption of CBA and traditional
financial appraisal methods
Decision Framing Contextualizing positive/negative aspects
of a decision (leading to Confirmation
Bias)
N/A None found
Endowment Effect Emotional attachment to a an entity for no
rational reason
Medium Sole adoption of CBA and traditional
financial appraisal methods
Equity Premium Puzzle Relative risk aversion between equity and
fixed investments
N/A None found
Feedback Loops Tendency to feedback outputs into inputs Low Feedback from appraisal methods and the
SFDC
Hindsight Bias Bias towards historical experiences Medium Management’s previous experience with
successful investment decisions
Information Cascades Dissemination of unattributed statements
(“rumors”)
Low Politics and culture regarding governing
and responsibility attribution
Loss Aversion Viewing loss as opposed to risk (i.e.
risk-seeking in the domain of losses and
risk-averse in the domain of gains).
Medium Need to maintain previously gained
employee support and trust
Mean Regression Aversion to extremes in favor of averaged
behavior
Low Insufficient innovative behavior and
guidance from externals
Mental Accounting Subdivision of losses and gains “mentally”
by investors (i.e. non-consolidation of
profit and loss)
Low Asset-driven mentality and worldview
Myopic Loss Aversion Loss aversion exhibiting a
disproportionately high sensitivity to
investment loss over short timescales
N/A None found
Rational Expectations Hypothesis The overweighting of historical over
current experiences
Low Management’s previous experience with
successful investment decisions
Reference Dependence A non-consolidated acceptance/rejection
of investment gain or loss based upon a
fixed reference value or objective
Medium Over-dependence on capital for the ERP
system
Representativeness Heuristics A preference for paying a premium for an
investment which may have below average
performance or outcome
N/A None found
Status Quo Bias Confirmation Bias within a group or social
context
Low Insufficient ownership and responsibility
attribution to employees
TABLE II
MORPHOLOGICAL FIELD (BASED ON [55]) OF BEHAVIORAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN ALPHA
Employee Commitment Cultural Change Training and Education Management Commitment
Status quo bias Confirmation bias Hindsight bias Information cascades
Reference dependence Feedback loops Mental accounting
Agency friction Loss aversion
Availability error Asset segregation
Biased expectations Mean regression
Anchoring effect
Endowment effect
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2) Agency Friction (AF): This is defined as the interrelation-
ship between investor and facilitating investment agent or body.
In Alpha, it is translated as conflictual relationship within the
management team and amongst team and employees, especially
at shop floor.
The MD was always pushing the company forward. The pas-
sion and dominance of the MD created organizational “energy”
to propel the company forward toward a strategic vision. The
management team appeared to be “weaker” apprentice-trained
engineers (again with little or no management experience). In
some respects, they were considered by shop-floor workers to
have been promoted beyond their ability. As a result, there
were numerous points of friction, specifically between the di-
rectors, who were shareholders needing financial return and
performance, and the management team that was capable but
lacking motivation and the management experience required to
deliver the ambition of the company. The shop-floor operatives
had limited respect and confidence in the (middle) manage-
ment capability, yet did respect the directors, largely because
the directors were considered to be (first and foremost) proven
engineers having built up the company from humble origins.
The dominating personality of the MD often resulted in the
opinions of others being quickly dismissed. Decisions were of-
ten taken independent of the senior managers that ultimately led
to a culture where managers were not consulted and left with
a feeling of having to be supportive of all decisions, as they
felt that they had limited influence to explore alternatives. The
consequence of a single point of influence underpinned by an
autocratic leadership style was that there was decisive decision
making but with no sense of collective buy-in.
3) Confirmation Bias (CB): This is generally defined as bias
toward results/behaviors; and as such, behaviors that confirm
predetermined outcomes ignoring all others. In the case of
Alpha, this is translated as reliance upon CBA and nonholis-
tic accounting of intangible factors.
The organization had a proven approach to the justification of
investments that had traditionally been capital purchases with
tangible efficiency returns—specifically, the use of CBA to jus-
tify the investment in CNC machine tools that produced a pro-
ductivity gain that could be easily financially quantified. Such
an approach was less suited to more intangible investment deci-
sions, such as the purchase or development of an IS. Embedded
bias occurred, as the investment decision was emotionally driven
and motivated by the MD while also being ex post evaluated by
the investment sponsor. As a result, there was little indepen-
dence in the reflective evaluation process as the MD appeared
unable to self-criticize previous decisions. Consequently, there
was a biased “embedded success” in all decision making that
was taken by the MD. The converse implication of this approach
was that any decision(s) not taken by the MD were considered to
have been total failures; all decisions were positive if the single
reference point for previous decisions originated from the MD.
4) Endowment Effect (EE): This is generally defined as emo-
tional attachment to an entity for no rational reason. In Alpha,
this can be translated as an overreliance on CBA and cost-
accounting methods.
A track record and perceived success resulting in endowed
confidence when using a CBA approach was clear. Applying
CBA to IT/IS decision making appeared to be a proxy for an
autocratic leadership style (over the management team), and a
paternalistic leadership style over a contingent of the operational
workforce. As a result, there was a combination of dominance
and confidence from different community groups; specifically
the management team was dominated and the operational work-
force offered confidence to the MD. Other such examples can
be cited, such as when the company was invited to showcase
itself among larger original equipment manufacturers (OEM),
which was accepted by the MD, although the cost was exorbi-
tant. However, the enticement and (endowed) self-justification
was overwhelming and led by the MD. The financial cost was
clear but the benefits and outcomes were opaque (in the sense
that other investment decisions were made using CBA) but the
characteristics of the leadership style were clear and evident
in the decision-making process. It would appear that over suc-
cessive years and notwithstanding the organizational structure,
there was a single point of failure/success that gravitated around
the MD.
5) Feedback Loops (FL): This is generally defined as a ten-
dency to feedback outputs into inputs. In terms of the case
context in this paper, this can be translated as the application of
an ISE approach to implementation of the SFDC module.
The company took an isolated approach to all investment
decisions. It did not link the inputs from one investment decision
with another. Hence, the last decision was always “right” and
so suggested the preceding decision was correct also as long
as the process remained consistent. There was clear contextual
evidence of using previous decisions perceived successful as
the basis of providing institutional confidence to support future
decision making. This institutional confidence was underpinned
by a biased and flawed approach to evaluation. Together with
the organizational culture, the management team felt unable to
challenge the MD about past investment decisions and the PIR
process, as a basis for a review in process.
6) Loss Aversion (LA): This is generally defined as viewing
loss of an entity/asset, as opposed to the risk of an entity/asset
(i.e., seeking risk in losses and being averse to risk in gaining
domains) [47], [51]. In the case of Alpha, they did not to lose
previously gained employee trust and commitment.
The organizational culture was one where the workforce ei-
ther came through a developed apprentice scheme, or were long-
standing employees of an OEM that had undergone a redun-
dancy process. Notwithstanding the size of the company and
its decision-making process and regardless of individual views,
there was evidence of high levels of affiliation and personal
endowment to the organization. Consequently, there was little
churn of staff because of the personal investment (in tenure) over
a long period of time with the company. While the management
and operational workforce may not have always appreciated the
autocratic undertone of the decision making by the MD, they did
appreciate the progressive approach of the company. There was
evidence that clarity of direction, a personal endowment to the
organization generated over longitudinal service mitigated the
autocratic leadership style of the MD. Personal energy invested
by staff resulted in organizational momentum, thus aversion to
loss was not an option (in terms of moving to a competitor or-
ganization that may have been more inclusive in terms of the
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decision-making approach, but have less clarity of direction).
7) Reference Dependence (RD): This is generally defined as
an either accepting or rejecting gains by an investment on the
grounds of a fixed reference value or objective [47], [51]. In
Alpha, it means overdependence on capital and funds for the
ERP system.
The institutional strategy was, in many respects, mimicking
large OEMs. While this may be fit for purpose within larger
companies, it often does not suit smaller businesses. The best
practices adopted by larger inspirational sector leaders, in some
respects, constrained the company’s own flexibility and growth
that required a responsive infrastructure typical of subcontrac-
tors. Strategy that did not necessarily have a direct financial
return drove the business forward. Interestingly, the MD later
distanced himself from being the original instigator. Such rever-
sals were motivated by later considered common sense rather
than pressure from colleagues. This led to a lack of group con-
sensus on decision reference points. Thus, the level of technol-
ogy acceptance and adoption was a new and moderating factor,
which was limited not by imagination but by delivery capability.
8) Status Quo Bias (SQB): This is generally defined as
CB within a group or social context [47], [51]. In Alpha, it
meant insufficient ownership and responsibility attribution to
employees.
The institution was driven by strong CB, where the MD was
always keen to be a trend setter rather than a follower, and there-
fore, often punched above his weight both within and outside his
company (he modeled his organization not against his peers or
similar-sized companies, but large Japanese companies). In this
respect, there was a bias toward strong, clear (if not transparent)
decision making, as such decisions were not always underpinned
by robust data but rather by emotion and intuition. However, the
intuition aspect was often biased as it was self-perpetuated and
based upon a sense of predetermined previous successes. The
MD was influenced by noncompetitive “gurus” and sector lead-
ers (regarding academics and noncompetitive people as offering
value while discrediting the success of other organizations of a
similar size and shape).
B. Causality of Behavioral Decisions in Alpha, Inc.
The authors used the output of MA-FAR into an FCM
model to explore the decision behaviors, relationships, and thus,
the implicit “energy” dynamic between each of the MA-FAR
factors.
A pairwise combination of the eight factors highlighted in
the previous section was carried out through a facilitated focus
group session with the case company participants. As a result of
carrying out this pairwise mapping, fuzzy causal weights were
assigned on a scale between –1 and 1 in increments of 0.25,
where a value of –1 signifies a very negative causal relation-
ship, 0 signifies a neutral or nonexistent causal relationship and
1 signifies a very strong causal relationship (the remaining in-
terstitial values are, hence, gradations between these). The first
author conducted the assignment of weights. To ensure relia-
bility, an independent coder also conducted weight assignment.
The convergence (agreement) of the coders was then checked.
When there was a disagreement, a further discussion between the
coders took place until agreement (convergence) was reached
[6], [36]. Table III gives the developed weight matrix for the
causal relationships between the identified factors.
Fig. 2 shows the resulting direct graph representation of
Table III.
Computing the reachability matrix for this initial FCM is
based upon
R = A + A2 + A3 (3)
where A is the reachability of the fuzzy matrix, Wij and where
for the purposes of this research A = Wij . The calculation of
R shows that the strength of the local causal relationships (col-
umn sum) occurs as: CB  EE  LA  RD  AE  FL 
AF  SQB; while the strength of the global causal relationships
(row sum) occurs as: AE  EE  CB  FL  RD  LA 
SQB  AF. This highlights that CB is locally influential among
all other nodes, while SQB is less so; and conversely, AE is
globally influential across the entire cognitive map, while AF is
less so.
We now turn to applying a given scenario vector—hence,
system model—to the FCM. This scenario describes a situation
where there is a greater focus given to sales promotion forecast-
ing, and hence, where there is less of a focus on collaborative
planning, time-series analysis, and prior information—and more
emphasis on supply/demand, direct intervention, and experience
factors, respectively. This is as a result of computing the output
of (1) to a given scenario vector, which represents each of the
FCM factors in turn. This is represented by the vector
[0.000− 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.250− 1.000 1.000]. (4)
By calculating the output of the matrix computation given in
(1) where the weight matrix Wij is that of Table III and the
initial vector Cti is (4), the resulting FCM weight matrix was
computed—hence, Table IV highlights the reachability of each
FCM. Fig. 3 shows the resulting FCM results per node.
Computing the reachability matrix using (3), shows that the
strength of the local causal relationships occur as: AF  RD 
CB  FL  EE  AE  SQB  LA; while the strength of
the global causal relationships occur as AE, LA, SQB  EE
 FL  CB  AF  RD. Hence, as before, this highlights
that AF is locally influential among all other nodes, while LA
is less so; and conversely AE, LA, and SQB are all equally
globally influential across the entire cognitive map, while RD is
less so.
The results of the FCM nodal values in Fig. 3, shows a
lead–lag relationship between RD, LA, CB, and EE factors,
which is mediated by the growth and decay response of factor
AF. Grouped together these causal factors broadly identify
behavioral decision making, which is biased in some respects in
response to the working relationship between senior manage-
ment and shop-floor workers (and vice versa). The SQB factor
alternates between strongly negative causal and strongly posi-
tive causal responses—which are mirrored by factor FL to some
extent. Hence, both of these factors identify with ownership of
and relationship to the investment decisions taken by Alpha.
An interpretation of this is that biases in the decision-making
processes were opposing the very organizational relationships
that they were rooted in. This suggests that such manufac-
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TABLE III
FUZZY WEIGHT MATRIX OF HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION FACTORS IN ALPHA, INC.
AE AF CB EE FL LA RD SQB 
AE 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 −1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 4.000
AF −1.000 0.000 −1.000 −0.250 0.000 −1.000 0.000 0.000 −3.250
CB 1.000 −1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 −1.000 1.000
EE 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 4.000
FL 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 −1.000 0.750 1.750
LA 1.000 0.000 0.000 −1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −1.000 −1.000
RD −1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.000 −0.250 1.000
SQB −1.000 −0.250 0.000 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.750
 −1.000 −0.250 3.000 2.000 0.500 2.000 2.000 −1.500
Fig. 2. FCM of the human and organizational decision-making factors in the ERP implementation context.
turing investment decisions were more reliant upon the very
assumption-based factors, which the management team was
seeking to avoid, but which were heavily related to the working
relationships within which the decision makers were rooted. In
order to put this further into context, by comparing both the
initial FCM and the scenario FCM matrix in Table IV, this
highlights that factor AE appears to be a common driving factor
across both cognitive maps; while factors LA, SQB, and EE,
respectively, have high levels of reachability (i.e., globally in-
fluential among nodes). This further supports the assertion that
there was a high degree of influence on the decision-making
process based upon a generally positive (although perhaps mis-
placed) assumption that future decisions would be as successful
as prior decisions, in the face of a lack of ownership of the
investment decisions by the company as a whole.
These dynamic causal interrelationships provide a rich pic-
ture into the behavioral drivers of the ISE scenario and show
the determining features of the decisions as a result. However,
the authors suggest that in order to gain further insight into how
these relationships affect and impinge upon individual and orga-
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF INITIAL AND SCENARIO FCM
ISE Decision factors (fuzzy nodes) Locally influential (East-West, FCM matrix row) Globally influential (North-South, FCM matrix column)
Initial Scenario Initial Scenario
R R R R
AE 3.000 2.513 14.000 21.000
AF 1.797 6.513 −3.203 −7.000
CB 11.000 5.562 7.000 −7.000
EE 8.125 5.012 12.000 −0.509
FL 2.656 5.550 6.734 −6.288
LA 8.000 1.632 1.000 21.000
RD 8.000 5.973 5.125 −7.000
SQB −0.469 2.450 −0.547 21.000
x¯ 5.264 4.400 5.264 4.400
 3.756 1.768 5.596 13.014
Fig. 3. FCM results.
nizational behaviors requires extending this analysis by carrying
out an econometric, energy auditing-based exploration of these
relationships. This is further explained in the next section.
C. Embodied Energy of Organizational Decisions
in Alpha, Inc.
Following the IO econometric approach [7], [29], the authors
take the relevant matrices from the FCM (causal model) as
follows in order to compute the IO demand using (2).
1) The “economic” transactions (matrix, A) is the fuzzy
weight matrix W.
2) The “direct requirements” of supply (vector, d) is the sce-
nario vector, Ct .
3) The “total requirements” of demand (vector, x) will be the
computed vector of required outputs.
Noting that the rank of the identity matrix, I, has to be same as
the rank of the matrix of transactions, A (i.e., the fuzzy weight
matrix, W), the researchers computed the IO of the decisions
encoded in the FCM through the matrix manipulation of (2).
By subsequently also noting that the inverse of the threshold
function given in (1) would need to be applied to scale the
demand vector, x, to the fuzzy interval [–1, 1], vector x was
calculated for both the initial and scenario-based FCMs and the
Fig. 4. IO model output and error norm for Alpha causal mapping.
L2 error norm computed as
l =
√
x2k + · · ·x2n (5)
where values xk are the individual elements of the demand
vector, x computed from (5), for k = 1, . . . , n and n is the
rank of x. The resulting errors and values for the IO responses
were calculated and standardized to the standard deviation of
the initial and scenario FCM nodal data from which a graph of
the distribution of IO values could be produced as in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4 highlights the “demand” of behavioral decision fac-
tors that underlie the causal interrelationships coded through
the fuzzy cognitive map. As such, it can be seen for the initial
202 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOL. 62, NO. 2, MAY 2015
FCM that RD, reference dependence, has a high negative de-
mand (−0.93148), which is mitigated by a high positive demand
at the opposite end of the spectrum, by SQB (0.81577). This un-
derscores the predetermination by Alpha management to base
its future investment decisions upon “reference successes” at the
cost of a lack of ownership of the decision-making process over-
all by the firm. The scenario FCM identifies different demands,
however, where both EE and AF have high negative demand
(−0.982); while FLs have high positive demand (0.9967). This
explains the investment decision process in terms of a prefer-
ence for utilizing nonholistic appraisal techniques such as CBA
as outcomes from previous decisions, as inputs to future de-
cisions: to the detriment of the working relationship between
management and shop-floor workers.
The authors now wish to view these IO aspects of decision
demand, through the lens of two contemporary perspectives on
how such decision demands are handled by individuals.
First, the authors rehearse the findings from the data that
show that the MD of Alpha was, to all intents and purposes,
seeking to make all judgement decisions himself with reference
to aspects of prior experience and knowledge (hence, anchoring,
referencing, and confirming biases of previous investment suc-
cesses). Although the authors have represented these elements
based upon notions of causal, behavioral, and demand aspects,
they now wish to reframe these by stating that the MD suffered
a case of “ego depletion” [2]. Baumeister [2] contended that
decisions affect self-control and vice versa. As such, the authors
of this paper propose that the MD of Alpha was indeed faced
with a conflict of both self-control and self-regulation given the
IO results data as shown previously (i.e., the sets of behavioral
demands were evenly matched, given the kurtosis and skewness
of the data in Fig. 4 tend toward a standard distribution).
Second, the complexity of making decisions under condi-
tions of cost benefit can also lead to increasingly difficult value
choices—hence, selection difficulty. Anderson [1] highlighted
this as “decision avoidance,” which is based upon a combina-
tion of a rational-emotional response to scenarios where execu-
tive decision function is routinely required. In this respect, the
authors, thus, also contend that while there was no “inaction
inertia” within the firm, there was some tradeoff between effort
versus accuracy by applying a tailored evaluation of the new IS
in Alpha. The attentional focus of the firm overall was set to be
outward-, rather than inward-, facing (which led to the ongo-
ing conflict with the status quo, leading to AF effects as noted
earlier). There was also clearly a preference for uncertainty in
some sense, as the application of a trusted approach was done
blindly—with the caveat that the firm had not made such a
manufacturing decision before and that this technique was the
most suitable in the absence of any other experience (hence, the
endowment effect of the CBA). Perhaps significantly, based
upon the perspective that Anderson [1] provided, the authors
also propose that, in this particular case, Alpha and the MD suf-
fered from anticipatory negative decision framing and counter-
factual thinking—all of which contributed to a reference depen-
dence on the funds and resources committed to the ERP project.
Needless to say, there was perhaps an emotional decision-
making response to investment in technology based upon a de-
pletion of self-control and self-regulation energy, which clouded
rational decisions based upon a decision strategy.
Following an “embodied energy” audit of all aspects of the
decision-making analysis [43], the authors proposed that the
embodied energy of the decision process within Alpha, was
driven by individual decision makers (such as the MD), which
had a negative impact upon the decision that was made to in-
vest in technology as a result of a focus on past decisions. This
focus was primarily driven by a combination of decision biases
in the form of a range of behavioral factors: AF (disagree-
ment between senior management and shop-floor workers); AE
(propensity to focus upon previous successful investment deci-
sions); LA (avoiding wanting to lose the trust of employees);
CB (reliance upon specific cost accounting methods to sup-
port a predetermined outcome); and feedback loops (applying a
prior evaluation model to a new investment scenario and hoping
to achieve similar results). Consequently, the authors contend
that Alpha, in some shape or form, furthermore underwent a
form of ego depletion wherein management—as well as the
rest of the firm—succumbed to a form of (investment appraisal)
decision fatigue. This fatigue was the result of feedback loop
behavior where prior decisions and tools were being endowed
with a greater prominence than they should have been. Thus,
an increase in emotional attachment to CBA and a reduction
in self-regulation by the rest of the firm and management team
(aversion to SQB, as shown in the FCM and IO models). Hence,
in a general sense, decision-making biases perpetuated the pro-
cess for investing in manufacturing IS in contrast to the lack
of decision-making ownership and responsibility displayed by
Alpha management to the shop-floor workers.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to explore the domain of IT/IS invest-
ment decision making through the lens of behavioral economics
and an associated energy accounting (equilibrium) method. In
doing so, it has leveraged the lenses of behavioral economics,
causality, IO equilibrium, and the general notion of depletion
of executive energy function to study the “embodied energy”
of the IT/IS decisions in manufacturing focusing on human and
organizational factors. The following was found.
1) Individual biases in the decision-making processes were
opposing the very organizational relationships that they
were rooted in. Investment decisions were more reliant
upon the assumption-based factors, which the manage-
ment team was seeking to avoid, but which were heavily
related to the working relationships within which the de-
cision makers were rooted.
2) The frictional relationship between the management board
and shop-floor workers (AF), coupled with management’s
experience with previous investment decisions (AE, RD)
was in direct conflict with the desire to mitigate a loss of
employee trust gained over many years (LA).
This paper contributes to the normative literature on ISE by
exploring the underlying behavior and energy involved in de-
cision making in ISE focusing on human and organizational
factors. It adds to the argument put forward by ISE scholars that
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human and organizational factors are significant in IS justifica-
tion in manufacturing [30], [45], [48]. Furthermore, it extends
this argument by proposing the aforementioned lenses to study
ISE behavior and embodied energy, suggesting that human and
organizational factors can lead to a (negative) state of organiza-
tional decision-making energy. The consequences to engineer-
ing management, therefore, being potentially profound. It illus-
trates how management fatigue around ISE decision making in
manufacturing can be expressed in the form of “ego-depletion”
[2] of the key decision maker (i.e., reduction in self-control,
self-regulation, and executive function—displayed as excessive
self-belief). Organizations, hence, need to be cautious of using
self-perpetuating models of investment appraisal where (mis-
placed) assumptions about intended benefits of the investment
may cause a bias by senior management to use (previously) suc-
cessful appraisal tools and techniques. Essentially, past success
is not indication of future outcomes.
Our analysis enables the development of a frame of reference
for ISE decision making based on human and organizational
factors. The ISE literature has underlined the behavioral issues
(e.g., politics and power) [4], [30] and has suggested tactics used
to influence the investment from the designation stage to retrying
the ERP investment proposal forever aiming at resolving any
conflict through the constant repeating of ISE feedback and
exploiting possible changes over time in the subjective appraisal
of the IT/IS investment in question [4].
The purpose of this research was to show that a process of
evaluating causal relationships, decision demands, and associ-
ated behaviors uncovers intrinsic richness and depth to the com-
plex nature of management-led investment decisions, in this
case, within an engineering management perspective. Hence,
this research does not seek to offer any conclusions of a gen-
eralizable nature—rather it offers other organizations that are
similar in context/process to draw parallels. And, as such, it
avoids the identified pitfalls associated with behavioral biases
and executive decision making.
This study provides engineering managers with insights on
the behavior and embodied energy underlying IT/IS investment
decisions. First, managers should be aware of the individual
biases and their effects on the IT/IS decision-making process.
No matter if they try to avoid these biases by balancing the al-
location of resources with a strategic overview of the IT/IS in
question, their skill and judgment are dependent on those organi-
zational/working relationships within which biases are rooted.
Second, to increase the level of shop-floor trust and support
in IT/IS decision making, managers should use their experi-
ence with previous investment decisions to inform shop-floor
workers about the benefits of investments and replace frictional
relationships with support and cooperation. Third, managers
should consider diversifying the IT/IS investment methods they
use during the decision-making process, base their selection on
the investment decision problem [22], [23], and avoid using
methods deeply rooted in organizational structures and routines
no matter how successful they have been in the past. Perpetual
use of particular methods may lead to decision fatigue (“ego-
depletion”) of the decision maker, influencing negatively the
investment decision-making process and outcome. Therefore,
by acknowledging and avoiding decision fatigue engineering
managers should be able to take better and unbiased decisions
towards successful IT/IS investments in manufacturing.
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